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There remains one significant nationalistic commitment of Polish historians which sometimes obstructs an understanding of the past. Since 1945 these historians have added Silesia to the nineteenth-century "Polish lands," an assumption which may bolster current political claims but which often obfuscates historical understanding of the role of the Prussian government and of the ethnic Germans in the area. Of course, this border question does not alter the perception that the existence of a majority Polish community and a minority German one helped create patterns of labor protest and labor organization different from those observed in the Ruhr valley, the other heavy industrial center of Imperial Germany, or in the Dabrowa basin, the mining area just across the border in Russian Poland.
Among the different forms of labor protest, the most visible is a mass refusal to work. In early periods of industrialization spontaneous strikes of workers revolved not only around questions of wages and hours but also around changes in traditional rule-making relationships. Particularly in the 1860s and 1870s, when both employers and employees were still adjusting to the withdrawal of the government High Mining Office from close supervision of mining and smelting operations in Prussia, a great deal of conflict developed over the uncertainty of rule-making power. Workers like those at the Baildon smelter (near Kattowitz) around 1870 were still inclined to look to government officials for redress of grievances brought on by what were considered high-handed acts of employers. 6 It quickly became apparent, however, that government bureaucrats would now abstain from interfering in the web of rule being established in private industry; from then on "bargaining" of all sorts could be carried on only at the plant level without interference from higher authorities. In fact, even the governmentowned facilities-mines near Konigshiitte and Zabrze and smelters in Friedrichshiitte and Gleiwitz-after 1865 were administered by bureaucrats who applied standards of management indistinguishable from those used by private mine and smelter administrations.7 A further strain in the relations between workers and their employers arose even in the business prosperity before 1873 when owners began to rationalize the old, non-profit-oriented work rules in order to promote greater production.8 Following the 1873 crash and the ensuing depression, the trend toward cutting costs accelerated, a process which included laying off the most inefficient sections of the still relatively small labor force.9 Now, more stringent work rules swept aside older patterns of condoning unwritten perquisites of employment and laxity at work, the "indulgency pattern."1' Thus, the largest pre-1889 strike in Upper Silesia, at the K6nig mine in Konigshiitte in 1871, resulted from the introduction of a more efficient system of checking daily attendance at work.l 1 One should be careful to note, though, that production problems in those early years did not result simply from the unwillingness of miners and smelter workers to abide by a new sort of industrial discipline, but also by difficulties of adjustment on the management side-the supervisors on the plant level often beat their workers, and the level of fines deducted from wages was so great that on paydays police had to be on duty at some mines to forestall rioting.
The local social structure exacerbated these clashes; in particular the dichotomy between the Polish and German communities runs as a leitmotif throughout the pre-1914 period in Upper Silesia. For example, Hugo Solger, the chief government official of the area of the mining and smelting basin (the then Beuthen County), blamed disorders at the Konig mine in 1871 on the conflict between the Polish Catholic working masses and the German Protestant officials. 2 Only some two decades later did German workers become more numerous; but even metallurgy, where they were most prominent, continued to employ enough Poles to be split into national communities.
Although occasional references to other labor disturbances in these first decades of free-enterprise mining and smelting appear in extant sources, it is difficult or impossible to differentiate between clashes based on further restrictions of the indulgency pattern and those prompted by a call for higher wages. In all likelihood the two were mixed in such affairs as the 1873 strike at the Scharley zinc mine, where workers "went limp" in the face of the police. The lean years of the 1880s were not devoid of attempts to organize workers-e.g., the St. Barbara Verein der Berg-und Hiittenarbeiter zu Konigshutte, the Chrzescijanski Zwiazek Robotnikow w Katowicach (Christian Union of Workers in Kattowitz) and others. 8 All of these groups faded quickly, primarily due to the supply of labor significantly exceeding demand. Conflict on the plant level remained far more important than industry-wide organized protest, at least until the last few years before the outbreak of World War I.
Employment and production began to rise in the late 1880s; and by the early 1890s Upper Silesian mining, and to a lesser extent smelting and metallurgy, had reached the point in their expansion where they employed more than 75,000 workers (about half the local labor force); heavy industrial employment increased to about 200,000 in 1913 (still about half). The rapid absolute growth is apparent not only in global figures but also in the beginning of a management complaint about a shortage of labor, a complaint which was to grow ever stronger from the late 1880s to 1914. 19 The strain in the labor market gave an impetus to two major trends: one, from management an effort to bypass the regular labor market by using women, minors and annual seasonal migrants from Russian Poland and Austrian Galicia;2 ? and two, from workers a rising labor militancy.
Employment policies of top management cannot be discussed here at any length. Women and minors played significant roles in Upper Silesia, but their number remained constant after 1895. The number of Slavic workers, however, was a variable on which employers set great hope. Although the social implications of the seasonal importation of workers into Imperial Germany are complex, this issue will be touched on only as it relates to the effects of the labor shortage. Suffice it to say that agrarian pressure groups were the primary force which brought about the changes in state policy allowing this population movement, which eventually included hundreds of thousands of people, the majority of whom were employed in agriculture. However, a number of heavy industrial employers also profited from this program, including seven mines which at one point had work forces composed of 20 percent or more foreign workers.2 The total number of migrants in the 1890s was small, never above 3.000 (2 to 3 percent of the mining force-few worked in smelting).2 2 After 1900 the labor market grew even tighter and urgent managerial requests for seasonal workers punctuated periods of prosperity. In 1904 the Poles from abroad (from 1905 Poles and Ruthenians) numbered over 4 percent of the mining force and from 1908-1913 constituted 15 percent or more of the labor force in mining. It is hard to gauge the impact of these potentially strike-breaking foreigners on the natives' labor action, but it was probably not decisive. After all, the largest strike in the entire prewar period took place in 1913, exactly when the number of aliens reached its peak.
The second major effect of the labor shortage, one more to the point at issue, was the rise in labor militancy. 1889 was the year of significant strike activity in all the major German mining areas. Although the Upper Silesian action lasted only five days, it involved about 15,000 men (30 percent of the coal miners and 13 percent of the ore miners) and engulfed about half the coal mines and one third of the ore mines in the area.2 3 The smelting and metal-working industries had no large strikes for many more years, or at least disturbances in that area have not been noted in the materials now available for study. Furthermore, that year saw the formation in Upper Silesia of a Polish labor union type organization, now endorsed by Katolik, the Society for Mutual Aid of Christian Workers in Upper Silesia (Zwiazek Wzajemnej Pomocy ChrzeScijanskich Robotnikow G6rnoslaskich), a group which in 1908 merged with other groups in Germany into the Polish Professional Union (Zjednoczenie Zawodowe Polskie).
In 1889 and in strikes of the 1890s the striking miners presented demands that in the main are reminiscent of highly industrialized states.24 Thus they wanted higher pay, shorter working hours and improved fringe benefits. On the other hand, unrest in 1889 was also traceable to the workers' complaints that they did not know what the work rules were. More particularly, they protested that when paid by the shift and not by piecework some of their shifts were not recorded if the demanded "normal production" was not delivered. Even more resented were the practices of forced overtime and of imposing fines in the form of temporary demotion to poorly paid positions. Finally, fringe benefits like free coal and cheap food were being undercut by delivery in the form of shoddy goods.
This second set of nonmonetary complaints reflects a situation not of worker reluctance to adopt the discipline demanded by modern industrial enterprise, but of management unwillingness to abandon the paternalism and high-handed ways commonly found in the early years of industrialization. Contrary to the assumption commonly made by students of modernizing situations,2 5 entrepreneurs and corporate leaders are often mistaken in formulating policies assumed appropriate to their own economic needs, sometimes even preferring to function on the basis of social prejudices. For example, the much vaunted labor shortage may have been due to extraordinarily low wages; and worker grievances were not always simply due to a distaste for work, as employers would have it. Other recorded reactions to these labor stoppages of the 1890s illustrate even more sharply this false contrast between the modernizing entrepreneur and the backward peasant turned industrial worker. Thus the directors of the government mines run by the Berginspektion K6nigshitte commented that workers, particularly unskilled ones, complained of inadequate wages not because wages were too low but because they squandered their money-thus the workers' "laziness" and "disorderly life." The mine directors also took the local working population to task for its "luxuriousness in clothing" and its "irresponsibly contracted marriages."2 6 Such pseudo-paternalism came out clearly in the threat of Friedrich Bernhardi, general director of the Giesche mining conglomerate, to evict striking miners from company housing at the Wildsteinsegen mine in 1890. 27 Employers may have been serving their own interests with such comments, but there is no reason for the observer to judge workers' actions by the same standards.
One must not go so far in the other direction to say that workers were ready to be efficient and disciplined industrial employees if only the employers had dealt with them differently. Absenteeism remained a significant problem down to 1914; even the incentive of bonuses for regular attendance was insufficient to curb this practice. Rapid turnover of workers also was common.2 8 These practices are sometimes assumed to be reflections of a pre-industrial mentality, when extra income is traded for leisure at a relatively low level; but it can also be contended that these patterns of behavior were simultaneously being used to express discontent with working conditions at a time when trade unions were not available to express such dissatisfaction.
Rising demand for coal from the late 1880s on and a vigorous expansion of all the local heavy industries starting in the late 1890s led workers to expect higher wages, but such demands can best be placed in context by understanding them as part of a whole series of differences over conditions of work. Thus the 14 strikes in the core mining and smelting region (Bethune County) in the 1890s were all extremely short-lived, usually one to two days,29 indicating a burst of anger over particular working conditions, not a long-term movement for higher wages. So at the Deutschland mine in Schwientochlowitz in 1893 the police and army intervened to end a walkout over forced Sunday work, a lengthened work day and threatened dismissals for malingering or destroying material.30 Elsewhere, at the Jakub mine of the giant Kattowitzer AG fur Bergbau und Eisenhuttenbetrieb, the local government administrator reported that one of the major elements in a strike of 1897 was resentment at the new manager, who was proving to be much more energetic than his predecessor,31 presumably through efforts to increase profits by undoing the prevailing indulgency pattern. Short strikes also broke out over raised production norms, such as at the Charlotte mine in Rybnik in 1903,3 2 but it is hard to know if such tightening of management can be described as cutting laxity or merely as a general desire to increase profits.
Modern students of labor strife tend to look for wage demands and organized groups pressing such demands. True, workers cared about wages-the major grievance in the Wolfgang mine strike in 18973 3 -but such a concern must be seen as part of a package of attempts by workers to maintain or improve their status in many ways. It is only with the large-scale strike movement of 1905-1907, the most significant such period since the great strike of. 1889, that an integrated set of demands appeared, one that seems in part to have been prompted by labor union planning: higher wages, shorter working hours, improved working conditions and union recognition.34 Yet the sources for these years also indicate a series of often isolated, uncoordinated outbreaks, perhaps encouraged in part by union organizing, but more likely the result of miners' taking advantage in an unorganized way of the heightened labor shortage brought on by a brisk demand for coal and zinc. Even though the government was allowing the immigration of Polish and Ruthenian seasonal workers in record numbers, management was too hard-pressed to wait out strikes or even to try to impose blacklists of workers, as had ordinarily been the practice. In the Rybnik region, where the first strikes of 1905 took place, 500 discharged workers found almost immediate reemployment in the very same area, while most of the workers dismissed for striking at the Konig mine were rehired very quickly by the same mine. 3 5 So far this paper has laid emphasis on worker protest as expressed at individual mines. Trade unions, as we have seen, for a long time remained minor elements on the Upper Silesian scene. In contrast to the Ruhr, no Otto Hue appeared to salvage the socialist miners' union; certainly the German Social Democrats were of no aid here, being pictured as both German and atheist. The Polish socialists (PPS) did little better, even though their publications in the 1890s illustrated an understanding of the attachment of the local worker to the church with such articles as "The Worker's Catechism" and the "Ten Commandments for Workers."3 6 During the stormy strike years of 1905-1907, rival unions engaged in some common action, but no long-term cooperative effort developed. The Society for Mutual Aid was the largest of the local groups, growing from 5,000 members in 1896 to about 14,000 in 1900.37 However, there were severe fluctuations in membership in ensuing years, to be noted presently. The Social Democratic miners' union, the "Alter Verband," had made few inroads into the primarily Polish-speaking local labor force; occasionally it was credited with adding to worker unrest,38 but that was all. Other unions were even less effective, such as the Organization of Catholic Unions based in Berlin. In addition, all of these organizations appealed primarily to miners; smelting workers and metal workers remained impervious to any union blandishments during the entire pre-war period.
On The change in the character of worker demands was truly evident in the major demands, centering on a pay raise and the introduction of an eight-hour day and mentioning little about work rules. It is also noteworthy that for the first time the strikers were essentially the skilled hewers, while the younger workers and semi-skilled and unskilled haulers tended to report to work; in previous large-scale strike actions the social alignment had been the reverse. 4 All of these points-the coordinated union activity, the essentially economic demands and the leadership of the more established workers-point clearly to the changing nature of labor protest. Miners were now set in their occupations and had adjusted to employer-employee relationships which they had earlier been reluctant to accept. Certainly wage cuts and extension of hours would not have been tolerated quietly, but this new kind of protest indicates that the definition of the everyday routine of mining seems gradually to have declined as a source of tension. Industrial labor discipline in large measure had been accepted; conflict now arose within a supposedly common pattern of rules at least from the side of labor.
On the other hand, management still functioned under the assumptions of an earlier age. Mining and smelting employers in pre-1914 Germany were known for their bitter opposition to union activity and any displays of worker independence. In contrast to the usual picture of new industrial workers refusing to adopt the requirements of factory labor, in the 1913 strike in Upper Silesia management again showed itself unready or unwilling to accept labor as a valid contributor to the process of structuring the work-place. That employers should defeat a strike is nothing novel, but their propaganda was quite absurd. In addition to mouthing the usual slogans about adequate wages, decent hours and superb working conditions, industrial managers drew on the German-Polish difficulties of Prussia and Germany to support the case that the chief purpose of the strike was ". . . the weakening of Germandom in Upper Silesia."42 So went the general judgment on such political demands as the eight-hour day. Significantly, the mine inspectors' reports of the strikes did not even mention Polish nationalism as having any influence in this case. 43 Even though some corporation directors may truly have believed in an immediate threat from Polish nationalism, it is hard to picture this charge as anything more than a red herring designed to undercut any potential public support for a strike led by a Polish union and as a sign of absolute unwillingness to consider a changing role for workers, despite the numerous legal changes in working conditions after 1900. It seems that managers needed to be "modernized" fully as much as workers did.
A Most interesting is the way these worker demands changed in nature. The conflicts in the early 1870s were in large measure the result of changes in work rules intended to make the labor force more productive; these changes were resented because they were clearly curtailing the privileges hitherto enjoyed by workers. 1889 witnessed the same clash over work rules, but many of the old patterns of indulgence had been muted and now the question of wages became important. Perquisites of mining jobs were still valued highly, but arrangements for free or cheap coal or reduced-price food had now been regularized as a condition of work, not as a sort of right over which workers exercised ultimate control. In the late 1890s and in 1905-1907 worker complaints turned more and more to wages, hours and other working conditions bearing on pay-like the measurement of coal produced. Finally, in the 1913 strike wages stood out as the key demand.
Boom periods, of course, did not cause such activity; they merely presented the opportunity for workers to press their desires. Were one to focus on recession periods, in all probability the same conflicts would emerge but with management better able to determine the changing rules of the work-place. The long-term trend, however, was obviously one in which workers came to recognize the right of owners and management to set and control the general conditions of work and in which the workers came increasingly to focus their grievances on issues directly affecting the amount of pay they received and the number of hours they worked. The emphasis here on periods of prosperity shows how grievances began to be frequently expressed through mass actions, sometimes organized by trade unions or by individual activity like frequent absenteeism and high job turnover. This development accompanied worker acquiescence in a labor discipline thought necessary to run large-scale mining and smelting industries in the industrial age; in short, there emerged what one would from a later perspective call a "modern" industrial labor force. FOOTNOTES 
